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Rationality and capitalist schooling 
 
By Thomas LAMBERT1† 
 
Abstract. In the field of philosophy of mind, the concepts of rational behavior, rational 
choice theory, and instrumental rationality (the ‚practical reasoning‛ version of rationality) 
are important in trying to make statements and conclusions about human thinking and 
behavior in general. Rational choice theory is also considered a normative but not a 
descriptive or positive theory.  Much of economic theory is based on the principle that 
economic agents usually or always behave rationally in maximizing the benefits and/or 
minimizing the costs of their decisions.  Developments in behavioral economics over the last 
several decades have begun to question this principle with much of the questioning about 
rationality and rational behavior centering on whether individuals can correctly and 
adequately assess probabilities and risk/reward.  The inability to correctly assess 
risk/reward limits rational behavior and can yield sub-optimal outcomes for economic 
agents.  This exploratory paper examines the linkages between schooling in a capitalist 
society and limits on rationality in a monopoly capital economic system. 
Keywords. Behavioral economics, Capitalist schooling, Monopoly capital, Rationality, 
Rational choice. 
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1. Introduction 
aworski (2011) writes that ‚intentionality and rationality are central to a 
public conception of mental phenomena‛ (p.30) and that ‚*T+o describe 
people’s behavior in terms of their beliefs, desires, and other intentional 
mental states is to classify that behavior as something that is explainable by 
appeal to reasons‛ (p.31).  One who acts consistently with his/her beliefs, 
desires, and other intentional mental states are thought or deemed to be 
behaving rationally. Irrational behavior is when one does not act 
consistently with his/her beliefs, desires, or attitudes (BDA) or acts contrary 
to her/his beliefs or goals.   
In the field of economics, rationality is an important concept to many 
economists in that rationality is used to explain the actions of 
agents/participants in different markets at the microeconomic (individual 
market) and macroeconomic (aggregate markets) levels. The MIT 
Dictionary of Modern Economics states, 
Rationality. Behavior by an economic agent (consumer, producer, 
government, etc.) which is consistent with a set of rules governing 
preferences. In consumer demand theory, for example, the rules, or 
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axioms, would include the axioms of completeness, transitivity, and 
selection.  Additional axioms are necessary to establish a testable 
theory of rational economic behavior. (p.360).    
And to go along with this, there is the definition or concept of 
‚economic man/woman‛ in which each person is assumed to maximize 
his/her utility (happiness) subject to such constraints as income, available 
information for decision making, and his/her preferences. An economic 
person is rational by maximizing his/her utility subject to his/her 
constraints, although if one does not pursue utility maximization, the main 
point is that each individual pursues his/her goals in a consistent manner2 
(MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics, 1989). This concept is applied to 
consumers, producers, managers, political leaders, and all participants in a 
market economy. By each person pursuing his/her own utility 
maximization, an entire society is made better off in as many ways possible 
along the lines of Adam Smith’s notion of each person pursuing his/her 
self-interest, and this in turn increases societal wealth (Smith, 2000). 
But whether one looks at rationality from a philosophy of mind point of 
view or from the discipline of economics point of view, there exists a 
debate about whether humans act rationally, and if they do act rationally, 
do they act sufficiently rational? In other words, the latter point refers to 
the question of how rational is rational enough, or to what degree should 
rationality be evaluated and held to be consistent. That is, if we believe that 
most people act and behave rationally, should the rationality of human 
behavior hold 100% of the time, 90% of the time, etc., and how can or how 
should rationality be evaluated? Should it be evaluated according to 
humans never making mistakes or never appearing to do or say things 
contrary to their BDA, or should it be evaluated according to humans 
mostly never making mistakes, etc.? Should incorrectly estimating the 
probabilities of the occurrences of certain events be considered irrational, or 
is this something to be considered rational within certain reasons or 
bounds?  Should one’s preferences be allowed to change, or is this a sign of 
inconsistency, and thus a sign of irrationality? Is one’s trying to think, act 
and behave rationally and consistently sufficient for rationality, or should a 
higher standard hold for rationality? In surveying the literature on 
rationality, the answers to these questions are not entirely clear, although 
 
2 One can moderate her/his utility maximization by acts of charity or altruism.  However, if 
this gives one happiness and helps to maximize her/his happiness, then it can be 
considered utility maximization for that individual.  Also, actions of moral hazard 
(reckless actions) should not be confused with irrational behavior since those who behave 
in a morally hazardous way often do so because they know someone will come to their 
rescue despite their reckless behavior.  Acting under conditions of asymmetric information 
is also not considered irrational behavior in that under conditions of asymmetric 
information one is at a disadvantage in an exchange with another party due to his/her 
having less information than the other party.  For example, in buying a used car, one 
cannot know everything about the car’s past history and performance whereas the original 
owner would.  For this reason, many laws have been enacted that require used car 
dealerships to give the name and number of a previous owner to a prospective buyer in 
order to correct for asymmetries in information between buyers and sellers.     
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economics is criticized as assuming that most or all market participants act 
with either full or bounded rationality, assumptions which some argue are 
not realistic. This is especially true, according to the critics, when one 
considers the educational backgrounds of different economic agents. This 
paper discusses the assumption of rationality and how it is influenced in a 
capitalist society through an educational system challenged by class 
differences and poverty.3 
 
2. The debate or “War” over rationality 
In reviewing the literature on the so-called rationality debate, most of 
the controversy appears to center around the path-breaking work of the 
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 
2011) as well as to a lesser but still important degree the work of the 
economist Richard Thaler (2015). 4   Neoclassical economics has always 
argued that most human agents think and act in a rational manner as the 
MIT Dictionary definition cited above indicates. This is different from 
heterodox economics views of human thinking and behavior. Karl Marx 
and Frederick Engels (1932) are credited with seeing human action and 
thought as mostly being influenced and dominated by a society arranged 
according to social class where societal values and norms are those of the 
wealthiest and most powerful political class. In contrast to economists who 
subscribed to full rationality, the iconoclastic economist Thorstein Veblen 
rejected the idea of a calculating robot as an economic person and thought a 
better view of human thinking and behavior was mostly along the lines of 
humans engaging in pragmatic action and having habits and instincts 
which were strongly influenced by human and societal institutions 
(Yilmaz, 2007; Brette, Lazaric, & da Silva, 2017). In the field of 
macroeconomics, John Maynard Keynes (1936) is noted for his concept of 
‚animal spirits‛ in which investors and industry leaders can act either too 
cautiously (bearish behavior) or too optimistically (bullish behavior) when 
such behavior is not warranted or even irrational from a rational agent’s 
perspective. Herbert Simon’s (1978 & 1997) concept of bounded rationality 
modifies the concept of full rationality or perfect rationality by stating that 
agents in complex situations often do not have all of the information, time, 
or cognitive abilities needed to make the best decisions possible, and so 
reaching optimal decisions is often illusive.  Therefore, most agents choose 
to ‚satisifice‛ in their decision making regarding their goals and pursuits.  
That is, and for example, instead of trying to attain profit maximization, 
private sector managers will often try to attain a satisfactory level of profits 
given their organization’s constraints, competitors, etc.   
 
3 This paper will mostly focus on the theme of rationality at the level of the individual with 
some discussion of collective action.     
4Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002, and Thaler won it in 2017.  Tversky 
did not receive an award because he passed away in 1996.     
 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
 T. Lambert, JEST, 6(4), 2019, p.218-233. 
221 
221 
Despite Veblen’s, Keynes’, Simon’s and other non-mainstream 
economists’ appeals to realism in rationality, they have mostly been 
ignored. In Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, the economics 
profession is accused of celebrating the idea (Simon won a Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1978) but mostly ignoring it by continuing to teach and 
practice the concept of full rationality in its models and theories because 
using the concept of bounded rationality complicates many of these models 
which center around optimization and an attempt to make economics as 
similar to physics as possible (Thaler, 2015, p.5 and 23).5 
The work of Kahneman and Tversky, as well as the subsequent work of 
Thaler, created quite a stir in the rationality debate and especially in the 
field of economics. These men are considered pioneers in the field of 
behavioral economics. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) developed the concept 
of ‚prospect theory‛, which in general held that people set the framework 
for a decision according to their past experiences and the outcomes of those 
past experiences (Barberis, 2013). This helps to make the decision-making 
process easier and helps one to understand the degree of risk and 
uncertainty in a situation according to his/her ‚heuristics and biases.‛  
They showed in their experiments that most people have a great degree of 
difficulty in assessing the probability of certain events, and people often 
used simple heuristics and biases in making a decision. That is, people 
tended to make decisions based on how they made decisions in the past 
using certain rules of thumb or experience and according to the outcomes 
of those past decisions. Perhaps more importantly, the successful outcome 
(a subjective matter) of the decisions may not have been based so much on 
the practicality or rationality of the heuristic or bias but in some cases due 
to chance.   
Additionally, they found that the alternatives that one faces in making a 
decision are analyzed according to 1) whether there will be gains or losses 
in reference to one’s present state of wealth or income; 2) one’s attitude 
toward risk where it is usually found in experiments that most people are 
risk averse and fear potential losses much more than potential gains 
whereas neoclassical (mainstream) economic theory predicts that most 
people should be neutral toward risk and weigh gains and losses equally; 
3) probability estimates of future events wherein most participants in 
 
5 While the author was in a graduate school economics program, most of the textbooks and 
instructors pretty much followed the assumption of full or nearly full rationality regarding 
the behavior of economic agents. Keynesianism was on its way out, and rational 
expectations was at full strength in macroeconomics, and in microeconomics, utility 
curves and revealed preferences always assumed rationality, which was basically full 
rationality. If questions were raised about whether people are fully rational or not, the 
general and usual response was that it does not matter. The main assumption was that 
people are trying to behave or act with full rationality, although the outcomes or results of 
their behavior may not always reflect it.  In reviewing the two of the main books used by 
the author in graduate school for advanced microeconomics, Nicholson (1989) and Varian 
(1992), there is no mention of Simon or bounded rationality.  The emphasis of each book is 
on full rationality.    
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experiments tend to overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high 
probabilities of events whereas mainstream theory would contend that 
such probabilities should be estimated with a high degree of accuracy;6 and 
4) how much the gain or loss is relative to one’s income or wealth since 
experiments show that the greater one’s wealth or income, one has 
decreasing sensitivity to gains or losses whereas mainstream theory 
indicates that wealth or income levels should not matter. Yet Kahneman 
and Tversky show research where two people have the same level of 
wealth and income, yet one has less utility or overall happiness than the 
other, all else held constant, because one has just suffered a loss of income 
whereas the other has just enjoyed a gain or raise in his/her income or 
wealth. Mainstream theory would indicate that their levels of utility would 
be the same, although behavioral economists would say that the levels of 
utility are not equal even though their levels of wealth/income are the 
same.7 In experiments and games that Thaler conducted, people were much 
more generous in giving money to others than what standard orthodox 
theory would have predicted.  
 
 
Figure 1. Expected Utility 
 
Figure 1 is a replica of a diagram commonly used in the literature to 
represent Kahneman’s and Tversky’s thinking and brings the ideas listed in 
points 1 to 4 together. Essentially, in reading from left to right and from the 
bottom to the top of the diagram, one’s expected utility of making a 
 
6  Kahneman and Tversky found that most people are not very good at estimating 
probabilities.  But is this really so surprising when so many people have trouble balancing 
their checkbooks (which is a matter of arithmetic).   
7 However, the concept of utility could cover this anomaly by indicating that the individual 
who has just suffered the loss was at a higher level at one time compared to the other 
person and now has sunk to a lower level.  The other has enjoyed a gain, and so now they 
are equal in total utility.  One has from a higher to a lower indifference curve, and the 
other has gone from a lower to higher indifference curve.  Losses and gains are indicated 
by these movements.    
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decision increases and at an increasing rate (increasing utility and 
convexity) as his/her risk of loss decreases (smaller negative utility 
numbers on the vertical axis in going from bottom to top and smaller 
probabilities of loss on the horizontal axis in going from left to right), yet 
when it comes to gains, one’s expected utility only increases at a decreasing 
rate (concavity in the utility function to the right of the origin) as the 
probability of gain goes up. Neoclassical/mainstream theory would argue 
that since most people are risk neutral in their decision making (gains and 
losses are evaluated equally), the figure below should have a straight line 
passing through the origin at a 45-degree angle according to Jacob 
Bernoulli’s theory of expected utility (Kahneman, 2011). Risk neutrality is 
supposed to be rational, not risk aversion or risk loving behavior.           
An example from the Kahneman and Tversky research can explain this 
phenomenon.  If people are asked if they prefer either 1) $500 given to 
him/her with certainty or 2) a coin flip which has a 50% probability of 
giving them zero dollars or a 50% probability of $1200, they almost always 
choose the $500 with certainty even though the expected payoff (and 
expected utility) from the gamble is $600 (=0.50 * 0 + 0.50 * $1000).  Hence, 
smaller gains with certainty are preferred to larger ones with greater 
degrees of uncertainty. Conversely, if asked whether one prefers to lose 
$500 with certainty versus taking a flip of the coin wherein one can 1) lose 
zero dollars with 50% probability or 2) lose $1000 with 50% probability, 
most will choose flip of the coin.  People prefer avoiding losses more than 
obtaining gains.  Since no money is actually involved in these experiments, 
Kahneman and Tversky have been criticized for writing about lab results 
and not actual real-life events, yet they contend that their results accurately 
reflect how people would actually behave in reality (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2011).   
Heuristics and biases appear to mostly be used when the consequences 
or costs of making a decision are low and are routine and if a decision 
needs to be made fairly soon.  For example, people often buy certain things 
at a particular retailer because they believe the quality of the items may be 
better there than at other retailers when in fact the quality may or may not 
be that different from similar retailers. That is, shoppers do not often 
engage in systematic research and instead rely upon past experiences to 
make future decisions especially if using past experiences save them time 
in decision making and if the costs are inconsequential. The demand for the 
retailer’s services and products by such types of individuals can also be 
deemed to be inelastic in that not much thought is given by many of the 
customers’ decisions to shop there. On the other hand, when given more 
time and when making a large purchase decision, such as buying a home, 
people seek more information and do more research in addition to perhaps 
using some of their heuristics and biases from past experiences. Their 
demand becomes more elastic, and they become more fastidious and 
judicious in making a decision. The concept of elasticity in economics is a 
traditional, mainstream one, but is tempered by behavioral economics 
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findings that often people make mis-estimations in their calculations and 
decision making. For example, most would claim that the demand for an 
adequate retirement is inelastic. That is, everyone should try to save as 
much money as possible given his/her budget constraints for retirement.   
Yet, as behavioral economics points out, many do not do this because of 
not correctly estimating their future needs or overestimating their future 
earnings because many people are not good at estimating probabilities or 
weighing gains and losses.8 Additionally, there are those who continue to 
live in a particular home or stay in his/her current occupation because of 
costs incurred in the past to obtain and keep the home or occupation, or 
people are risk averse to moving or changing occupations even if to do so 
would be an improvement for them financially perhaps (Clark & Lisowski 
2017). These are sunk costs which neoclassical economists say should not 
and do not matter to people, yet the behavioral economists in their 
experiments find that people find these relevant in decision making. This is 
another way in which people are sometimes irrational, and according to 
Thaler (2015, p.93-94) markets often do not encourage rationality but 
instead encourage a certain degree of irrationality due to hype, greed, and 
exuberance. Finally, behavioral economics also shows that even after 
committing an error in decision making, people often continue to commit 
the same error by using their same set of heuristics and biases.   
Samuels, Stich & Bishop (2002) mention that the evolutionary 
psychologists point out that in experiments where respondents are asked to 
estimate probabilities of the occurrences of certain events using frequencies 
rather than probabilities, the portion of respondents getting an answer 
correct is much higher than using decimal numbers or percentages for 
probabilities. The evolutionary psychologists claim that this is so because 
our primordial ancestors learned how to assess probability from 
experiences and encounters with repeated and similar situations/events, an 
aspect of our evolutionary learning which would be based on frequencies 
and not decimal numbers or percentages. That is, an anthropoid who saw 
one of his/her hunting mates attacked after ten hunting excursions would 
think that the chances of his/her being attacked during the next expedition 
are 1 in 10, not 10% or 0.10, and this estimate is based on his/her learned 
experience. To give someone a problem involving a single case situation, 
such as the probability of someone having an inherited disease based on a 
stated, percentage probability value, is something that most of us cannot 
calculate or resolve very well because we are not programmed as such by 
evolution.9 
 
8 This paper argues that this is also a symptom of income and wealth inequality, which is a 
societal and not necessarily an individual problem.    
9 Sloman, Over, Slovak & Stibel (2003) claim that the reason why people perform better with 
frequencies is illusory in that stating a problem in terms of frequencies is just another way 
of framing a problem or situation in terms of ‚nested sets‛, which in turn makes the 
problem under consideration more transparent.  That is, in general it is easier for most 
people to visualize 1 out of 1000 people as having a disease as opposed to 0.1% of a 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
 T. Lambert, JEST, 6(4), 2019, p.218-233. 
225 
225 
In contrast to Samuels, Stich, and Bishop, the philosopher Sturm (2012) 
claims that there are profound differences between the two sides of the 
rationality debate and that bounded rationality is distinct from irrational 
behavior. He does not see people making errors in estimating probabilities 
or clinging to sunk costs as forms of irrational behavior because people are 
still attempting to weigh costs and benefits when making decisions, 
although their calculations may be imperfect.  Sturm agrees with other 
critics of the heuristics and biases approach that the reason why people 
make mistakes in the Kahneman and Tversky research are what he calls 
‚experimental artifacts‛—particular wording of the problems, no use of 
outside sources to help subjects to work problems, etc. Sturm mostly favors 
the bounded rationality approach to decision making, although he sees 
problems with this approach as well. He sees the key difference between 
the two schools of thought, one seeing more rational behavior among 
people than the other, revolving around their normative assumptions with 
heuristics and biases assuming irrationality, and bounded rationality 
assuming mostly rational, albeit weakly rational, behavior and decision 
making.      
 
3. Schooling and rationality 
“Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic 
makeup means that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an 
inherited illness.  Does this mean that if their first child has the illness, the 
next three will not have the illness?” 
 
Table 1. Estimating Odds by Educational Levels 
Correct Answer: No 
Degree Yes No Total 
Less than High School 34 117 151 
High School 91 563 654 
Junior College 6 101 107 
Bachelor 21 234 255 
Graduate 8 139 147 
Total 160 ,154 1,314 
Pearson chi-square (4) = 31.1996 Prob.=0 
   
“Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic 
makeup means that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an 
inherited illness. Does this mean that each of the couple’s children will have 
the same risk of suffering from the illness?” 
 
Correct Answer: Yes 
Degree         No Yes Total 
Less than High School 57 102 159 
High School 169 489 658 
Junior College 27 82 109 
Bachelor 46 207 253 
                                                                                                                                       
thousand people because things such as Venn or Euler diagrams can be drawn or 
imagined by someone trying to work a problem.   
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Graduate 18 128 146 
Total 317 1,008 1,325 
Pearson chi-square(4) =  28.9542 Prob. = 0 
  Source: Smith, et al., 1972-2016, General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, 2016 data). 
 
According to some literature, educational and income levels affect risk 
taking behavior (the higher one’s level of age, wealth and income, the more 
risk averse one is), and the greater one’s education, the more risk loving 
one is and the greater one’s ability to be able to correctly estimate 
probabilities (Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann, 2007,  Booij, van Praag, & van 
de Kuilen 2009, Kim, Kim, Syngioo, Booyuel, Pop-Eleches, 2018). In 
analyzing data from the General Social Survey (GSS) from the National 
Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago it appears 
that education matters in estimating probabilities. See Table 1. Using a Chi-
square test, it appears that one’s level of education is statistically significant 
and related to one’s being able to answer questions regarding probability 
regardless of how the question is worded. This indicates that education and 
learned abilities are important in decision making, and hence, people 
perhaps can be educated to be more ‚rational.‛ This is a line of thought that 
does not appear to be explored that much in the behavioral economics 
literature.   
These findings also raise questions regarding social class and rationality 
as well.  In Table 2, again using GSS data from 2016, the higher one’s self-
identified social class, the better one is at estimating odds. The results are 
statistically significant at an alpha of 5% using the Pearson Chi-square test.  
Yet, the behavioral economists, although critical of neoclassical economists 
regarding rationality, never really challenge the neoclassical economists on 
how education and social class may influence rationality, although Thaler 
(2015) notes that many public policies need to be re-examined due to the 
fact that there exists less rationality and rational behavior among the 
general public than what is commonly assumed by policy makers. He lists 
as examples policies on retirement, social security, and consumer lending.   
 
“Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic 
makeup means that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an 
inherited illness.  Does this mean that if their first child has the illness, the 
next three will not have the illness?” 
 
Table 2. Estimating Odds by Class Identification 
Correct Answer: No 
Answer Lower Class Working Class Middle Class Upper Class Total 
Yes 23 81 55 2 161 
No 101 510 490 42 1,143 
Total 124 591 545 44 1,304 
 Pearson chi-square(3) =  10.4503   Prob. = 0.015 
   
“Now, think about this situation. A doctor tells a couple that their genetic 
makeup means that they’ve got one in four chances of having a child with an 
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inherited illness. Does this mean that each of the couple’s children will have 
the same risk of suffering from the illness?” 
 
Correct Answer: Yes 
Answer Lower Class Working Class Middle Class Upper Class Total 
No 42 145 113 12 312 
Yes 81 456 430 34 1,001 
Total  123 601 543 46 1,313 
Pearson chi-square (3) =  10.1143   Pr = 0.018 
  Source: Smith, et al, 1972-2016, General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, 2016 data). 
 
In looking at Table 3, there appears to be a pattern between poverty 
levels and mathematical achievement by seniors in US high schools since 
2005.  High school seniors who participated in the Free/Reduced Lunch 
Program because of their families’ low income levels scored lower on 
standardized mathematics exams than their peers who did not participate 
in the program because of their higher household income levels. Part B of 
Table 3 shows these differences to be statistically significant.  People in 
general may be bad overall in estimating probabilities, but if a symptom of 
poor decision making is incorrect mathematical calculations, then the bulk 
of those making errors could be from poor and less educated backgrounds.  
If those who are deficient in math skills make poorer decisions on average 
than others with better skills, they may be considered ‚irrational‛ in their 
decision making, but their irrationality could be driven by class and income 
considerations.  
 
Table 3. Average scale scores for grade 12 Mathematics, by National School Lunch 
Program eligibility, 2015, 2013, 2009, and 2005 
Part A: 
Year Eligible Not Eligible 
2015 137.559 159.8385 
2013 138.8755 161.4239 
2009 136.8584 159.0997 
2005 131.6057 154.4975 
Part B: 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances  
     Eligible Not Eligible 
Mean 136.2246671 158.7149091 
Variance 10.18128701 8.845372254 
Observations 4 4 
Pooled Variance 9.513329632  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 6  
t Stat -10.31199882  
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.42995E-05  
t Critical one-tail 1.943180281  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00004860  
t Critical two-tail 2.446911851  
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education 
Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2015 
Mathematics Assessments). 
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4. Monopoly capital and capitalist schooling  
In heterodox economics, there has always been the complaint against the 
neoclassical/mainstream/orthodox economics assumption of full rationality 
in most if not all microeconomic and macroeconomic models. Many non-
mainstream economists would contend that Kahneman, Tversky and 
Thaler in their experiments simply supported what many heterodox 
economists already knew about and assumed regarding flaws in rationality 
and rational behavior theory in economics.  Heterodox economists have 
mostly assumed that individuals think and act with bounded rationality 
while being influenced by societal and environmental factors (Sen, 1977; 
Wolozin, 2004; Marnet, 2005; Pressman, 2006; Lee, 2009; Markey-Tolwer 
2017). Markey-Towler (2017) claims that the best view of rationality in 
economics is one that is more similar to weak artificial intelligence, which is 
closest to a form of bounded rationality.     
Additionally, Tversky, Kahneman, and Thaler only consider things from 
an atomistic/individualistic point of view, which is a severe weakness. As 
Tables 1 to 3 show, it appears that one’s level of education and social class 
are statistically significant and related to one’s being able to answer 
questions regarding probability regardless of how the question is worded. 
This indicates that education and learned abilities are important in decision 
making, and hence, in this way people can probable be educated to be more 
rational and to make better decisions.   
So why are more people not educated to be more rational?  Perhaps one 
answer lies in the analysis of schooling in the United States by the authors 
Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis (1976 and 2002) as well in the writings of 
Baran & Sweezy (1966) on the prevailing social and economic climate that 
exists in the United States. Bowles and Gintis have argued that public 
schools in the United States have never really been designed or funded to 
be successful, and so bad to mediocre results are tolerated by US school 
systems despite periodic ‚school reform‛ efforts. Instead, they write that 
US public schools reflect the interests of the dominant capitalist class in 
conditioning students as future workers to be accepting of workplace 
conditions where hierarchies of authority exist. Schools are set up as 
hierarchies with strict rules which mirror many workplace settings in 
which employees do not question managerial authority just as students do 
not question school authority. A system of rewards and punishments (e.g., 
good grades versus bad grades, recognition for good students) instills a 
notion of meritocracy in the thinking of students, which more easily allows 
them to accept social inequality when they join the workforce. Most of all, 
learning technical and knowledge skills on the part of the students is not as 
important as students learning personal skills which help them in the 
workplace to get along with managers and fellow employees. Although 
learning math and communication skills are emphasized as important by 
school leaders, the personal skills are more important. Finally, poor and 
low-income students usually live in poor and underfunded school districts.  
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Since school districts are mostly locally funded, inequality is allowed to 
persist in the poorer ones. 
According to Baran & Sweezy (1966), a main tenet of their theory of 
monopoly capital is that there is a lot of waste in capitalistic economic 
system, and much of the waste is funneled into government spending on 
the military and public infrastructure which supports and perpetuates 
urban sprawl. Additionally, there is wasteful business spending on 
advertising, promotions, product packaging, and financing. Although the 
state, local, and federal governments in the US spend billions of dollars 
annually on public elementary, middle and high schools as well as welfare 
and other social programs, these forms of spending are not considered as 
effective forms of public investment since too much spending on education 
and social programs can lead to a less compliant labor force and working 
class, an argument similar to that of Bowles and Gintis. Therefore, 
spending is never adequate for these types of government programs, and 
so public schools in the US lag behind their private school counterparts 
which are mostly patronized by upper income families and students. The 
underfunding of public schools reinforces class differences among the 
different social classes in the United States, and for this reason most never 
rise above the socioeconomic status of their parents. Educational ‚tracks‛ 
within public schools classify students according to their academic abilities, 
which are basically a reflection of their socioeconomic status (see Baran & 
Sweezy, 1966, Chapter 10, ‚On the Quality of Monopoly Capitalist Society).  
Along the lines of the monopoly capital school of thought, O’Connor (1973) 
believes that one effect of so little spending on public schooling is to 
provide the more competitive sectors of the US economy (restaurants, retail 
stores, cleaning services, etc.) with a sufficient number of low-skilled and 
less educated workers. An ample supply of such workers permits this 
sector to pay low wages when compared to other industries which need a 
greater number of more highly skilled and educated workers who are often 
college graduates.     
The notion that less education leads to less rational behavior or decisions 
not in the decision maker’s interest is indirectly argued by behavioral 
economists by their showing how some respondents in their surveys mis-
estimate probabilities, something which is supposed to indicate less than 
rational decision making. If this is the case, then we would expect those 
with less education and lower socioeconomic status to perhaps more 
frequently make decisions against their own interests than those with more 
education or greater status. Table 4 shows GSS data that indicates that 
although a higher percentage of lesser educated (and probably lower 
income) individuals agree that the government should do something to 
lessen inequality to a greater degree than their more educated peers, there 
are still some among the lesser educated who think the government should 
not do anything. These responses could be indicative of a healthy 
skepticism of government action by some lesser educated individuals, or 
they could be indicative of acting against one’s self-interest by incorrectly 
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estimating the benefits or expected payoff/utility of supporting greater 
government action to reduce inequality. Also, recall that Kahneman and 
Tversky claim that most people are risk averse. Given the results of Tables 
1 and 2, and in using the logic of the behavioral economists, one could 
conclude that an irrational response is being indicated in the responses of 
the lesser educated survey participants.    
     
Table 4. Education, Opinions on Income Differences, and Social Class 
Part A:  Education by Degree and Response to Question ‚On the whole, do you think it 
should or should not be the government's responsibility to< Reduce income differences 
between the rich and poor?‛ 
 
Highest Education Definitely Should Probably Should Probably Should Not Definitely Should Not Total 
Less than High School 58 57 26 20 161 
High School 178 183 175 124 660 
Junior College 29 31 26 24 110 
Bachelor Degree 61 71 63 64 259 
Graduate Degree 39 40 48 19 146 
Total 365 382 338 251 1,336 
Pearson chi2(12) =  29.5695   Pr = 0.003 
     
Part B:  Education Level of Respondents by Class Self-Identification.   
Highest Degree/Diploma Lower Class Working Class Middle Class Upper Class Total 
Less than High School 68 171 77 9 325 
High School 172 807 453 19 1,451 
Junior College 18 114 79 2 213 
Bachelor 20 175 319 19 533 
Graduate 8 61 215 31 315 
Total 286 1,328 1,143 80 2,837 
Pearson chi2(12) = 417.9719   Pr = 0.000 
Source: Smith, et al, 1972-2016, General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, 2016 data). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler should be congratulated for pointing 
out inconsistencies in mainstream theories, and they offer reasons why 
people are so inconsistent and make errors in decision making. They argue 
that sub-optimal decision-making warrants better public policies, such as 
not cutting or eliminating a government program such as Social Security, 
because most people cannot rationally plan for retirement. However, they 
do not consider the inequalities in a capitalist system which give rise to 
many not being able to adequately save for retirement, which is perhaps a 
bigger factor in the need for Social Security. In this way their analysis is 
incomplete, which is often the case with the neoclassical school of thought 
that they criticize. If educational and socioeconomic factors matter 
significantly in the rationality debate, then these need to be examined and 
discussed more by all researchers of rationality.   
This paper has tried to emphasize the role that education and class can 
possibly play in rational decision making if one uses the assumption that 
correctly estimating probabilities and outcomes is important to better 
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decision making on the part of economic agents and households. As the 
behavioral economists point out, the implications of poor decision making 
on the part of many presents challenges not only to mainstream economic 
theory but also to policy making. Perhaps if the US educational system is 
somehow improved, better decision making on the part of the public will 
result, although this may result in a threat to the existing economic and 
social order in the US in that more members of the public could become 
more aware of the economic alternatives they face and their likely 
outcomes.   
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